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CHAPTER 10
The Philosopher’s Medicine of the Mind: 
Kant’s Account of Mental Illness 
and the Normativity of Thinking
Krista K. Thomason
Contemporary readers are unlikely to turn to Kant for insights into mental 
illness. First, his account of mental illness contains classifications that are 
often fluid and ambiguous. Even though he seems to offer taxonomies, it 
is unclear how serious he is about them. Second, since Kant is widely read 
as a champion of the power of reason and mental self-mastery, readers 
might expect him to dismiss mental illness as weakness. In his moral phi-
losophy, for example, he argues that a human being must “bring all his 
capacities and inclinations under his (reason’s) control” (MM 6: 408). He 
describes the medical science as “philosophical” when “the sheer power of 
man’s reason to master his sensuous feelings by a self-imposed principle 
determines his manner of living” (Medicine 7: 101). Claims like these 
make it seem as though Kant might blame people with mental illnesses for 
failing in their obligations of self-mastery. In spite of these apparent disad-
vantages, I argue that Kant’s account of mental illness is illuminating with 
regard to his views about the normativity of thinking and that it is not as 
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callous as it might seem. Here I argue that Kant’s account of mental illness 
is best understood as part of his applied logic. The domain of applied logic 
is partly to identify obstacles that human beings will face as they try to 
apply the rules of thinking in their lives. On Kant’s view, mental illness is 
one such obstacle. Mental illness causes our thinking to become disor-
dered, and once this occurs, Kant argues that we cannot simply will it back 
to order. Although Kant does prescribe a “diet of the mind,” he neverthe-
less does not believe that mental illnesses are the result of a failure to 
exercise one’s cognitive powers properly (Maladies 2: 271). I argue that 
Kant has a nuanced view of both the causes and treatments for mental ill-
ness. Additionally, I argue that his view is both compassionate to people 
who suffer from mental illness and is consistent with his commitments to 
rational self-governance.
10.1  Background and overview
Kant’s account of mental illness is influenced by his historical context, so 
it is important to briefly introduce some of the ideas about mental illness 
that were present in Kant’s day. First, eighteenth-century conceptions of 
mental illness are difficult to categorize. A wide range of behaviors and 
conditions counted as madness and many of them do not match present 
methods of classification (Lindemann 1999, 28–32). What is more, there 
was disagreement among medical writers about the categories and causes 
of mental illness (Lindemann 1996, 262–265; 1999, 31–33). Although 
Galenic humoralism was still influential in the eighteenth century, there 
were also proponents of vitalism, environmentalism, and iatrochemistry 
(Lindemann 1999 8–10 and 85–90). Different theories and causes of dis-
ease led to different recommendations for cures and therapies. As 
Lindemann puts it, “Eighteenth-century medicine contained bits and 
pieces of all these ‘systems,’ and they were all to be found in discussions of 
what caused disease and what health was” (Lindemann 1996, 265).
We know Kant kept abreast of the developments in medicine and health 
during his lifetime (Wiesing 2008, 221 and Foucault 2008, 109–112). 
Kant regularly corresponded with Marcus Herz, his friend and former 
student, who was a practicing physician in Berlin, and he commented 
Samuel Thomas Soemmering’s On the Organ of the Soul (Zammito 2018, 
434). At least two of the more influential medical writers of the time 
period appear in Kant’s work: Christoph Hufeland and John Brown. 
Hufeland sent Kant a copy of his Die Kunst das menschliche Leben zu 
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verlängern (The Art of Prolonging Human Life), on which Kant com-
mented (Unna 2012, 273–274). Kant’s reply eventually became his essay 
“On the Power of the Mind to Master its Morbid Feelings by Sheer 
Resolution. A Letter in Reply to Privy Councillor and Professor Hufeland.” 
Hufeland’s work was one of the influential texts of the period and was 
written for a popular audience (Lindemann 1996, 262–264). Also influen-
tial in the time period was the work of John Brown, the Scottish author of 
Elementa medicina (Wiesing 2008, 222 and Lindemann 1996, 264–265). 
Kant references Brown’s work in the Anthropology and the Metaphysics of 
Morals (Anth 7: 255 and MM 6: 208). Characteristic of both Hufeland 
and Brown (as well as other writers at the time) was (a) an emphasis on 
dietetics (preventing illness with health regimens) and (b) a loose distinc-
tion between mental and physical health (Lindemann 1996, 263–265; 
1999, 30–32). As we will see, Kant’s own thoughts about health and men-
tal illness share these characteristics.
Providing an overview of Kant’s conception of mental illness is chal-
lenging because it is unclear exactly how systematic his views are.1 
Additionally, there is some debate about precisely what Kant means by 
“mind” or “mental.”2 Kant’s primary remarks on mental illness are found 
in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Essay on the Maladies of 
the Head, Conflict of the Faculties, and On the Philosopher’s Medicine of the 
Body. As was typical in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Kant 
makes various attempts at classifying mental disorders (Lindeman 1999, 
22–23 and Munsche and Harry 2012, 224). Kant’s main taxonomy 
appears in the Anthropology in Book I “On the cognitive faculty.” There 
Kant identifies defects of the cognitive faculty as either “mental deficien-
cies” or “mental illnesses” (Anth 7: 202). The list of mental deficiencies is 
wide ranging and seems to have no systematic classification, although Kant 
does divide the illnesses into either “melancholia” or “mental derange-
ment” (Anth 7: 204–212). Mental derangement then admits of a further 
division into amentia, dementia, insania, or vensania (Anth 7: 215). In the 
1 Here I will be drawing heavily on Frierson’s account (2009a, b, 2014).
2 Kant usually uses the terms Krankheit des Gemüths or Gemüthskrankheit for “mental ill-
ness.” The term Gemüt is translated into English as “mind,” but it has a wider connation that 
may not be properly captured in the English translation. For a helpful explanation, see 
Rohden (2012). As Rohden argues, the nuances of the term seem to cause the most confu-
sion in Kant’s aesthetics, but elsewhere Kant uses it to denote a wide and neutral word for 
thinking. In the discussion of mental illness, I think Kant intends this wider connation. 
Thanks to Ansgar Lyssy for asking about this.
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earlier Maladies, the classification is slightly different. At first, Kant starts 
with a division that resembles the Anthropology’s: cognitive defects are 
either “impotency” or “reversal” (Maladies 2: 263). Kant’s descriptions of 
the difference between these two seem to match the differences between 
deficiency and illness. Once Kant starts to describe the frailties in more 
detail, however, he uses a three-fold classification. “Derangement” is “the 
reversal of the concepts of experience” (Maladies 2: 264). “Dementia” 
occurs when “the power of judgment is brought into disorder” (Maladies 
2: 264). Finally, “insanity” happens when “reason has become reversed 
with respect to more universal judgments” (Maladies 2: 264).
How seriously should we take Kant’s taxonomy? Although Kant’s clas-
sification in the Anthropology seems earnest, it seems less so in Maladies. In 
the beginning of Maladies, Kant writes, “I see nothing better for me than 
to imitate the method of physicians, who believe they have been very help-
ful to their patient when they give his malady a name, and will sketch a 
small onomastic of the frailties of the head” (Maladies 2: 260). Kant 
appears to be sarcastic here: it does not actually help a mental patient when 
we name his malady, but Kant will follow this convention anyway. This line 
also appears after he makes the joke that “doctors of the understanding, 
who call themselves logicians” have “made the important discovery: that 
the human head is actually a drum which only sounds because it is empty” 
(Maladies 2: 260). Kant is not sarcastic in the Anthropology, but we see at 
least one hint of hesitation. In the case of derangement, he says that it is 
“difficult to bring systematic division into what is essential and incurable 
disorder” (Anth 7: 214). Kant explains that it is a mistake to become too 
preoccupied with classification because “all methods of cure in this respect 
must turn out to be fruitless” (Anth 7: 214). Kant’s skepticism about the 
taxonomy is consistent with the pragmatic goals of his account of mental 
illnesses. The point of examining them is for the purposes of understand-
ing ourselves and each other as well as working to prevent such disorders. 
If the taxonomy does not serve these purposes, then it has little point.
Given Kant’s historical context, I suggest that we ought not see the 
taxonomy as particularly stringent. This is not to say that we ought to 
ignore Kant’s distinctions; rather, we will gain more from his discussion by 
examining how he describes the differences between mental illnesses 
rather than the categories into which he places them. It is difficult to ren-
der systemically Kant’s views about mental illness, but the main feature of 
Kant’s account of mental disorder is its focus on the pragmatic (Frierson 
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2009a, 269). The question we face is how exactly to understand the prag-
matic dimension of his account of mental illness.
10.2  The PragmaTic dimensions of menTal illness
As Kantians have argued, Kant’s approach to anthropology is pragmatic 
rather than physiological (Frierson 2009b, 293–295; 2014, 206–208; 
Cohen 2017, 263–264). Kant’s vision for anthropology is an investigation 
of what “a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of 
himself” (Anth 7: 119). If we think of Kant’s account of mental illness as 
consistent with this commitment, we can construct three possible ways of 
understanding what “pragmatic” means in this case.
One possibility is that Kant’s aim is clinical: perhaps he describes men-
tal disorders so that readers can learn how to avoid them.3 This interpreta-
tion faces some challenges. For example, as Frierson points out, we should 
expect Kant to provide more extensive details on prevention of mental 
disorder, but those details are lacking (Frierson 2009b, 293). In some 
places, Kant seems to suggest that some mental disorders are heredity and 
incurable (Anth 7: 214; Maladies 2: 263). If we take these comments at 
face value, then it is hard to see what advice readers are meant to take 
away. Additionally, Kant is clear that it is wrong to attribute someone’s 
mental disorder to bad behavior. In a lengthy passage in Maladies, 
he writes:
I cannot even in any way convince myself that the disturbance of the mind 
originates from pride, love, too much reflection, and who knows what mis-
use of the powers of the soul, as is generally believed. This judgment, which 
makes of his misfortune a reason for scornful reproaches to the diseased 
person, is very unkind and is occasioned by a common mistake according to 
which one tends to confuse cause and effect. When one pays attention only 
a little to examples, one sees that first the body suffers, that in the beginning, 
when the germ of the malady develops unnoticed, an ambiguous reversed-
ness is felt which does not yet give suspicion of a disturbance of the mind, 
and which expresses itself in strange amorous whims or inflated demeanor or 
in vain melancholic brooding. With time the malady breaks out and gives 
occasion to locate its ground in the immediately preceding state of mind. 
(Maladies 2: 270–1)
3 I take the term “clinical” from Frierson (2009b, 293).
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Similar comments appear in the Anthropology: “People often claim to 
know how to indicate the accidental causes of this illness [madness], so 
that it may be represented not as hereditary but rather as acquired, as if the 
misfortunate one himself were to blame for it” (Anth 7: 217). Kant claims 
that people mistakenly think certain behaviors cause madness when in 
reality it “presupposes a madness, without which he would not have fallen 
into such behavior” (Anth 7: 217). If we are not to blame for falling prey 
to some mental disorders, then to what extent are we supposed to be 
responsible for preventing them?
Another way to understand the pragmatic dimension of Kant’s account 
is encyclopedic.4 There is some reason to think that Kant was interested in 
improving anthropology in this way: in a 1773 letter to Herz he writes 
that he intends to make anthropology into a “proper academic discipline” 
(Correspondence 10: 145). We know that Kant was particularly critical of 
anthropological theories in his time. He was opposed to physiological 
approaches, like those found in Platner and Descartes, which he refers to 
as “a pure waste of time” (Anth 7: 119) and “eternally futile inquiries” 
(Corr 10: 145).5 If he seeks a better alternative, then his discussion of 
mental illness may be in the service of developing the “proper academic 
discipline.” This interpretation would also explain why Kant offers a tax-
onomy of mental disorder. His attempts at classification might be in the 
hopes of establishing rigor. Nosology for mental illness was a major theme 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, so there is reason to think 
that Kant was simply continuing in this tradition.6 Yet this interpretation 
is unable to explain why Kant is so insistent that anthropology should be 
a pragmatic pursuit. Kant acknowledged that the physiological approach 
to anthropology was useful within the academy (Jacobs 2003, 111–112; 
Louden 2011, 67–68). Although Kant likely thought that the academy 
could benefit from his account, he seemed to be calling for an anthropol-
ogy that is concerned with what “comes after our schooling” (Anth 7: 
120). Further, his letter to Herz notwithstanding, Kant was particularly 
skeptical of the possibility of making anthropology into a proper science. 
One reason had to do with the type of knowledge it was: because its sub-
ject matter is ordinary human life, anthropology can only ever admit of 
4 I take this term from Jacobs (2003, 114).
5 For more on Kant’s critique, see Jacobs (2003), Frierson (2009a), Louden (2011), and 
Zinkstok (2011).
6 See Munsche and Harry (2012, 226).
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empirical certainty, which is insufficient for real science (Jacobs 2003, 
109–110). Additionally, anthropology requires humans to observe them-
selves in order to reach its conclusions, and Kant has reservations about 
this methodology (Jacobs 2003, 110–111; Frierson 2014, 4–6). Even 
though Kant is certainly interested in anthropology and sees it as impor-
tant, the challenges he identifies to making it a proper science appear 
insurmountable.
If the clinical and encyclopedic interpretations face difficulties, perhaps 
Kant’s description of mental illness is better understood as part of his 
moral anthropology. In the preface to the Anthropology, Kant contrasts his 
approach to that of the physiologist. While the physiologist might study 
memory, for example, by thinking about “traces of impressions remaining 
in the brain” or “cranial nerves and fibers,” the pragmatic anthropologist 
will study the memory in order to know “what has been found to hinder 
or simulate memory in order to enlarge it or make it agile” (Anth 7: 119). 
The example of memory helps explain how anthropology might be tied to 
Kant’s moral project. Understanding how memory works can help us to 
cultivate or refine it. Kant argues that part of the project of virtue is to 
develop ourselves, which includes our natural talents, our cognitive capac-
ities, and our physical powers (MM 6: 419, 444). Anthropology involves 
learning about all these sorts of capacities. As Louden describes it, when 
we “choose to use our knowledge of human nature for moral purposes 
[…] our anthropology becomes a moral anthropology” (2011, 69 empha-
sis original). What does the moral anthropology interpretation tell us 
about Kant’s remarks on mental illness?
At first glance, the moral anthropology reading seems the most promis-
ing. Kantians have argued that Kant’s approach to anthropology can be 
best understood as an application: the knowledge that we gain from 
anthropology is supposed to aid us in our practical life and dealings with 
others (Louden 2011; Schmidt 2005; Cohen 2014). Scholars have argued 
that Kant’s remarks on affects and passions (Louden 2011, 70–71; Frierson 
2009b, 297–298), temperaments (Cohen 2017, 266–268), and character 
(Schmidt 2007, 179–177; Frierson 2009b, 298; Louden 2011, 73–75) 
help to spell out these conditions. Kant’s remarks on mental illness at first 
seem to be part of the same task. For example, Frierson points out that 
both affects and passions, which Kant calls illnesses of the mind,7 are 
7 “To be subject to affects and passions is probably always and illness of the mind because 
both affect and passion shut out the sovereignty of reason” (Anth 7: 251, emphasis original).
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hindrances to morality (2009b, 296–298). Cohen argues that each of the 
four temperaments (sanguine, choleric, melancholic, and phlegmatic) are 
accompanied by various cognitive pitfalls, which we need to be aware of in 
order to cultivate our cognitive capacities in the service of morality (2017, 
263–266). Along these lines, we might think that mental disorders pose 
moral obstacles and that anthropological knowledge of them will help us 
avoid or overcome those obstacles.
Before we proceed, we should note a few caveats. As we have seen ear-
lier in this volume, the notion of moral anthropology in Kant’s work is 
debated (Sensen, Chap. 5 and Louden, Chap. 7).8 There is always the 
looming question about the relationship between Kant’s commitments to 
pure moral philosophy and the empirical world of the human.9 With 
regard to mental illness in particular, this interpretation faces the same 
challenge as the clinical interpretation. It is unclear how much responsibil-
ity Kant thinks we bear for preventing mental disorder and Kant does not 
provide many details about how to develop mental health. Additionally, it 
is not immediately clear how mental illness relates to moral anthropology. 
One of the places where Kant discusses moral anthropology directly is in 
the Metaphysics of Morals in the section entitled “On the Relation of the 
Faculties of the Human Mind to Moral Laws” (MM 6: 211). Predictably, 
we find the faculty of pleasure and displeasure and the faculty of desire 
discussed here. Mental illnesses are classified under the faculty of cogni-
tion and it is notably absent from this section. Kant’s division in the 
Anthropology appears to confirm that the cognitive faculty is correctly left 
out. Affects and passions appear in Book III, which covers the faculty of 
desire (although the affects are actually housed in the faculty of pleasure 
and displeasure).10 Mental illnesses are discussed in Book I, which covers 
the faculty of cognition. Character and temperament appear in the second 
8 For more on the debate, see Frierson (2014), Louden (2011), Cohen (2017), and 
Schmidt (2007).
9 Louden suggests that Kant’s views about the purity of morality shifted over time (Louden 
2011, 66). Cohen points out this challenge, but agrees with Louden that if anthropology is 
used to help apply morality in practice, it does not threaten the purity of Kant’s moral theory 
(Cohen 2017, 257). Schmidt argues that the tension is resolved because once we realize that 
Kant means two different things when he talks about anthropology being an “application” 
of morality (Schmidt 2005, 70–73).
10 “In this section, we should also deal with affects as feelings of pleasure and displea-
sure. … But since these are often confused with the passions […]. I shall undertake a discus-
sion of them when the occasion arises in the third section” (Anth 7: 235).
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part of the Anthropology. Although Cohen is correct to point out that 
natural temperaments and character have associated cognitive weaknesses, 
it is difficult to draw conclusions about the relationship between tempera-
ment and mental illness. Kant discusses melancholy in both places, but 
there is no necessary relationship between melancholy as mental illness 
and melancholy as a temperament. The melancholic person is “disposed to 
melancholy” but this is different from “the person afflicted with melan-
choly, for this signifies a condition” (Anth 7: 288). Moreover, Kant identi-
fies the temperaments as involving “the faculties of feeling and desire” 
(Anth 7: 286). This classification would support the conclusion from the 
Metaphysics of Morals that the faculties of mind connected to morality are 
primarily feeling and desire.
Caveats aside, both the clinical interpretation and the moral anthropol-
ogy interpretation capture important insights about Kant’s account of 
mental illness. They both correctly identify Kant’s account of mental ill-
ness as having normative dimensions. The question is how best to under-
stand and articulate those dimensions. Expanding on both of these 
interpretations, I will argue that Kant’s account of mental illness is best 
understood as part of the project of the applied logic.11
10.3  aPPlied logic and menTal illness
In order to show that mental illness is part of applied logic, I should first 
explain Kant’s account of applied logic. In the first Critique, Kant divides 
logic into its “general” and “particular” uses (CpR A52/B76). Applied 
logic is a type of general logic and is “directed to the rules of the use of the 
understanding under the subjective conditions that psychology teaches 
us” (CpR A53/B77). Kant explains that because applied logic has “empir-
ical principles” and cannot be “a canon of the understanding in general 
nor an organon of particular sciences,” but rather “a cathartic of the com-
mon understanding” (CpR A53/B77–8). What does it mean for applied 
logic to be a cathartic? Kant writes:
It deals with attention, its hindrance and consequences, the cause of error, 
the condition of doubt, of reservation, of conviction, etc., and the general 
and pure logic is related to it as pure morality is related to the doctrine of 
11 For arguments about the relationship between Kant’s anthropology and applied logic, 
see Zinkstok (2011) and Cohen (2018).
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virtue proper, which contains merely the necessary moral laws of a free will 
in general, is related to the doctrine of virtue proper, which assesses these 
laws under hindrances of the feelings, inclinations, and passions to which 
human beings are more or less subject, and which can never yield a true and 
proven science, since it requires empirical and psychological principles just 
as much as that applied logic does. (CpR A54/B78-A55/B79)
Pure logic and applied logic relate to each other just as the laws of morality 
relate to the doctrine of virtue. Both applied logic and the doctrine of 
virtue must have some empirical content; they both “assess” what the pure 
laws of their respective domains look like in real human life. The aim of 
applied logic is to understand what thinking looks like in actual human 
beings and to identify the pitfalls we face in trying to organize our think-
ing according to the pure laws of logic.12 The point of this examination is 
to help us improve our thinking and to correct error. Applied logic “says 
what one ought to do in order to make correct use of the understanding 
under various subjective obstacles and restrictions; and we can also learn 
from it what furthers the correct use of the understanding, the means of 
aiding it, or the cures for logical mistakes and errors” (Jäsche 9: 18). The 
parallels that Kant draws between applied logic and the doctrine of virtue 
are instructive. As Kant writes in the Metaphysics of Morals, he thinks of 
virtue as a kind of strength to resist “obstacles within the human being’s 
mind” that will prevent her from doing her duty (MM 6: 380). Kant 
scholars have argued that applied logic likewise has as one of its tasks the 
identification of the sources of error in our thinking (Lu-Adler 2017, 
222–226, Cohen 2018, and Merritt 2018). For example, there are 
extended discussions of prejudice as the source of error in the Blomberg, 
Vienna, Dohna-Wundlacken, and Jäsche logic lectures (Blomberg 24: 
161–194, Vienna 24: 862–879, Dohna 24: 737–742, and Jäsche 9: 
75–81). In order for us to think well, we must be familiar with the obsta-
cles we will encounter that might prevent us from doing so. Schmidt 
argues that Kant’s discussion of applied logic in the first Critique is 
designed to be part of a “project of improvement” that Kant continues in 
Book I of the Anthropology (Schmidt 2005, 71). Book I is of course the 
book where Kant discusses cognition and it is where the remarks on men-
tal illness appear.
12 For arguments to further support this claim, see Schmidt “Anthropological Dimensions,” 
Zinkstok (2011) and Lu-Adler (2018).
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In Book I, Kant includes his discussion of mental illness under the 
broader category of “defects of the cognitive faculty” (Anth 7: 202). He 
divides the defects into either “mental deficiencies” or “mental illnesses” 
(Anth 7: 202). Mental illnesses are then divided again into “melancholia 
(hypochondria)” or “mental derangement (mania)” (Anth 7: 202). Both 
types of mental illnesses are characterized by disordered thinking, but 
what distinguishes them is the way thinking is disordered. Kant claims that 
in the case of melancholia “the patient is well aware that something is not 
going right with the course of his thoughts” whereas in the case of mental 
derangement, there is “an arbitrary course in the patient’s thoughts” 
(Anth 7: 202). As I mentioned above, we should be wary of reading too 
much in to Kant’s taxonomy. I suggest that the specific taxonomy is less 
illuminating than the two modes of disordered thinking that characterize 
the two main types of mental illness. Indeed, this part of Kant’s account is 
the most consistent across the works where he discusses mental illness: 
some mental illnesses involve disordered thinking that the subject can 
identify as disordered while others involve disordered thinking that the 
subject does not or cannot identify as disordered.
In On the Philosopher’s Medicine of the Body, Kant marks the distinction 
by asking whether “the mind has been dethroned” (Medicine 15: 943, 
marginal notes). If it has been dethroned, Kant claims that these patients 
“should be committed to the care of doctors rather than philosophers, 
since the mind, displaced from its throne, is not sufficiently aware of the 
rules of a sound mind—for this, the mind has to be in control of itself” 
(Medicine 15: 945). Here we see the same notion that appears in the 
Anthropology; the patient cannot even tell that her thinking has become 
disordered, so there is no point in trying to help her think better. Similarly, 
in On the Conflict of the Faculties, Kant claims that medicine is philosophi-
cal “when the sheer power of man’s reason to master his sensuous feelings 
by a self-imposed principle determines his manner of living” and it is 
empirical when it “seeks the help of external physical means (drugs or 
surgery) to stimulate or ward off these sensations” (Conflict 7: 101). This 
distinction is similar to the other works, but Kant talks more in terms of 
control. Philosophical medicine is for mental illnesses that can be managed 
by reasoning better while empirical medicine is for mental illnesses that 
require external management. Obviously, philosophical medicine will only 
work on someone who is still capable of guiding her thinking. In contrast 
to some of the other taxonomies, Kant claims that hypochondria is the 
“exact opposite of the mind’s power to master its pathological feelings” 
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and the “weakness of abandoning oneself despondently to general morbid 
feelings that have no definite object (and so making no attempt to master 
them by reason)” (Conflict 7: 103). Oddly, Kant then writes, “As long as 
a man is afflicted with this sickness we cannot expect him to master his 
morbid feelings by sheer resolution; if he could do this, he would not be a 
hypochondriac” (Conflict 7: 103–104). On the one hand, it appears that 
hypochondriacs make no attempt to master their sensations, and yet it is 
also a mistake to think that they can merely resolve to better control their 
feelings once they are in the midst of the affliction. Kant’s remarks here 
demonstrate one of the nuances of his views on mental illness. Although 
we are responsible for keeping our thinking ordered, it does not follow 
from this that we can reorder our thinking by sheer force of will once our 
thinking becomes disordered. Once our thinking becomes disordered, we 
may need external interventions of the sort that empirical medicine uses. 
In Kant’s own case of managing his hypochondria, he reports that he was 
helped by a “purely mechanical” explanation of the cause of his morbid 
thoughts: his “flat and narrow chest” leaves “little room for the movement 
of the heart and lungs” (Conflict 7: 103). As Kant explains: “The oppres-
sion has remained with me, for its cause lies in my physical constitution. 
But I have mastered its influence on my thoughts and actions by diverting 
my attention from this feeling, as if it had nothing to do with me” (Conflict 
7: 104). Kant could not, without the help of this mechanical explanation, 
simply pull himself out of his hypochondria by the power of reason alone. 
He needed the mechanical explanation to help divert his attention away 
from thoughts about imagined illnesses. Yet the hypochondriac can tell 
that something is wrong with his thinking even if he cannot reason himself 
straight.
In Essay on the Maladies of the Head, it is harder to see the two types of 
disordered thinking, but it is the earliest essay and also the essay where 
Kant is the most flippant about the idea of categorizing mental illness 
(Maladies 2: 260, 2: 264). There is, however, some textual evidence that 
supports the division I have suggested. Like the Anthropology, Kant’s dis-
cussion of mental illness in Maladies follows his discussion of mental defi-
ciency. He marks the distinction between the two this way: “I come now 
from the frailties of the head which are despised and scoffed at to those 
which one generally looks upon with pity” (Maladies 2: 263). Why is the 
first set of frailties despised and the other pitied? Recall the lengthy passage 
I cited earlier. Kant writes that he cannot bring himself to believe that the 
latter afflictions originate in “who knows what misuse of the powers of the 
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soul” because such a claim results in “scornful reproaches to the diseased 
person,” which Kant describes as “very unkind” (Maladies 2: 270). Kant 
seems to suggest that this judgment is unkind because the afflicted person 
is suffering from this misfortune through no fault of his own. He explains: 
“When one pays attention only a little to examples, one sees that first the 
body suffers, that in the beginning, when the germ of the malady develops 
unnoticed, an ambiguous reversedness is felt which does not yet give sus-
picion of a disturbance of the mind, and which expresses itself in strange 
amorous whims or inflated demeanor or in vain melancholic brooding” 
(Maladies 2: 271). I think the phrase “ambiguous reversedness” is telling. 
I have suggested that the main difference Kant marks between mental 
disorders is whether the patient can tell something is wrong with his think-
ing. Here Kant seems to suggest that a physical cause (“the body suffers”) 
gives rise to the early stirrings of the mental illness (“the germ of the 
malady develops”), but that this early stage can easily go unnoticed. The 
patient may start to experience disordered thinking, but not in a way that 
would raise particular alarm. It would show up as “strange amorous 
whims” or “inflated demeanor” or “melancholic brooding.” At this stage, 
the patient might be able to tell that something is not right with her think-
ing, but if she does nothing about it, the disorder in her thinking can 
become more severe. In Maladies, Kant seems to suggest that disordered 
thinking of which the patient is aware can, if left unaddressed, become 
disordered thinking of which the patient is unaware.13 This claim is consis-
tent with his remarks in the Conflict essay that once thinking becomes 
disordered enough, it may be beyond the patient’s abilities to re- order her 
thinking using reason alone. This would explain why Kant thinks it is 
unkind to reproach the person suffering from conditions such as dementia 
and insanity. Although Kant does not suggest elsewhere that the two types 
of disordered thinking are related in this way, the Maladies essay can still 
be read as consistent with the account I offer here.
At the end of his discussion of mental illness in the Anthropology, Kant 
claims that all forms of madness have only one “universal characteristic,” 
which is “the loss of common sense (sensus communis) and its replacement 
with logical private sense (sensus privatus)” (Anth 7: 219, emphasis origi-
nal). This loss of common sense occurs in different ways and Kant surveys 
different explanations throughout his works. Sometimes the culprit is an 
out-of- control imagination (Medicine 15: 943–944, Conflict 7: 103, Anth 
13 See also Maladies 2: 260.
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7: 215). Sometimes the cause is some hereditary trait (Medicine 15: 945, 
Maladies 2: 271, Anth 7: 217). Sometimes the source is some ailment of 
the body (Medicine 15: 945–946, Maladies 2: 270). My suggestion here 
is that the causes of disordered thinking are a secondary concern for Kant. 
Instead, I have argued that the question that is of most importance to him 
is whether or not the patient knows her thinking is disordered. If we read 
Kant’s remarks about mental illness as belonging to his account of applied 
logic, we can explain why this would be his primary concern. Applied 
logic’s domain is the application of the rules of thinking in real human life. 
This project must have an empirical part because we must be able to iden-
tify what sorts of obstacles we will face in trying to think well. The person 
who can tell when her thinking is disordered is in a better position to 
recover and to aid in her own recovery. Crucially, this does not mean that 
she will be able to reason herself well. She may need help from others, help 
from philosophical medicine, and even help from medical interventions. 
But if she knows something is not right with her thinking, she can find her 
way back to common sense.
10.4  menTal illness and The dieT of The mind
As part of the task of the applied logic, Kant’s account of mental illness is 
meant to help identify features of the human condition that will hinder 
our abilities to think well. Yet Kant seems to go beyond simply identifying 
the dangers of mental illness. Kant seems to give scattered suggestions that 
there are steps we can take to help stave off mental illness. For example, 
Kant warns against the use of psychotropic drugs, since they can artificially 
induce madness (Anth 7: 216). He argues that we should be careful with 
novels because they can encourage a wild imagination (Anth 7 2: 08).14 
Kant suggests that philosophers are well-suited to add in the recovery of 
mental illness by prescribing a “diet of the mind” (Maladies 2: 271). Kant 
clearly thinks that there are steps we can take to help ourselves prevent or 
manage our disordered thinking. Given the account I’ve offered here, 
what does this diet of the mind look like?
First, it is clear that Kant does not believe people can reason their way 
out of mental illness. Even those who know their thinking is disordered 
are not always capable of simply talking themselves out of it—Kant gives 
his own hypochondria as an example (Conflict 7: 103–104). Moreover, it 
14 Also, on the dangers of the imagination, see Medicine 15: 944.
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is unkind to blame people who suffer from mental illness for their own 
affliction. As Kant argues in Maladies, even those who know that some-
thing is wrong with their thinking may not know how to fix it, and it is 
unlikely that the cause of their disordered thinking is some misuse of their 
mental capacities (Maladies 2: 270). Given these commitments, there is an 
apparent tension in Kant’s account. On the one hand, we are usually not 
responsible for becoming afflicted with mental illness and we cannot rea-
son our way to a cure. On the other hand, we are supposed to take preven-
tative steps from allowing our thinking to become disordered. How can 
we reconcile these two aspects of Kant’s view?
My suggestion is twofold. First, because Kant thinks the only universal 
characteristic of madness is the substitution of private sense for common 
sense, the first step to preventing disordered thinking is simply the same 
requirement that all thinkers have to maintain healthy reason. Kant is clear 
in several of his writings that the common sense [sensus communis] we lose 
in madness is a “necessary touchstone (Probierstein)” for our thinking.15 
As he puts it in the Anthropology, we use the sensus communis to test “the 
correctness of our judgments generally” and “we also restrain our under-
standing by the understanding of others, instead of isolating ourselves with 
our own understanding and judging publicly with our private representa-
tions” (Anth 7: 219, emphasis in original). The person with a healthy 
reason is someone who reasons together with others and who tests her 
own thinking against the thinking of others.16 We ought not, on Kant’s 
view, isolate ourselves and rely too heavily on our private judgment, and 
this is true for all thinkers in general. This practice will of course not guar-
antee that we will prevent mental illnesses. Kant thinks that it is unlikely 
that mental illnesses are caused by the misuse of our cognitive faculties. 
Yet the practice of thinking together with others will make it easier to dis-
cover when our thinking has become disordered. Kant is clear that we test 
our judgments against the judgments of others when we are unsure about 
our own thinking. We even do this with regard to our sense experiences. 
Kant writes, “There are also many cases where we do not even trust the 
judgment of our own senses alone, for example, whether a ringing is 
merely in our ears or whether it is the hearing of bells actually being rung, 
but find it necessary to ask others whether it seemed the same to them” 
15 See also CpR A820/B848, Blomberg 24: 188, and Vienna 24: 874–876.
16 For further arguments about this requirement of thinking well on Kant’s view, see 
Gelfert (2006) and Pasternack (2014).
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(Anth 7: 129). To use Kant’s example, if it turns out no one else hears 
ringing that I hear, this might be a sign that something is wrong either 
with my ears or with my sense experience. I will only know if something is 
amiss if I check my own judgments against the judgments of others. This 
part of the diet of the mind is no different from Kant’s general require-
ment that we take steps to develop a healthy reason. Although it will not 
cure mental illnesses or prevent them entirely, it will at least help alert us 
to the possibility that our thinking has become disordered.
Second, Kant can consistently recommend that patients afflicted with 
mental illness should participate, as much as they can, in their own recov-
ery. Even though, for example, the hypochondriac cannot master his mor-
bid thoughts by sheer force of will, he can nevertheless play an active role 
in managing his disordered thinking. Sometimes this participation will 
take the form of seeking medical interventions. Kant is clear that doctors 
can play a significant role in alleviating the suffering of people with mental 
illness. Doctors can provide “remedies which might relieve the mind by 
attending to the body; by driving diseases from the mind or warding them 
off, these remedies could keep its health guarded and in good repair” 
(Medicine 15: 946). When diseases of the mind are caused by diseases of 
the body, a doctor’s prescription for bodily health can help address mental 
health. Kant also claims that doctors can “produce an effective, healthful 
medication that will help the body by working directly on the mind, cheer-
ing it up or alleviating worries by suppressing, or even stimulating affects” 
(Medicine 15: 946). In other words, even mental illnesses that are not 
caused by a bodily illness can be effectively treated by medication designed 
to affect the overall health of the mind. On Kant’s view, there is no reason 
that a patient suffering from a mental illness should not seek out these 
kinds of interventions. Additionally, Kant’s own battles with hypochon-
dria provide an example of non-medical intervention that the patient can 
use. As he points out, he has never been cured of his illness: “The oppres-
sion has remained with me, for its cause lies in my physical constitution” 
(Conflict 7: 104). Nevertheless, the explanation that his narrow chest is 
the cause of his morbid feelings has allowed him to master hypochondria’s 
influence “by diverting my attention from this feeling” (Conflict 7: 104). 
When Kant starts to experience morbid feelings, he uses the mechanical 
explanation of his illness to help him divert his attention away from it. He 
is not simply reasoning his way out of his morbid feelings. He is providing 
his attention with a different object on which to focus so that it does not 
exacerbate his morbid feelings. This sort of intervention is consistent with 
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Kant’s claim that we cannot by sheer resolution reorder our thinking even 
if we know it is disordered. We cannot think ourselves well, but this does 
not mean that we cannot help ourselves get better.
10.5  conclusion
I have argued that Kant’s account of mental illness is better understood as 
part of his applied logic. On Kant’s view, we must be aware of the possible 
obstacles we will face in trying to be good human thinkers. Mental illness 
is one of those possible obstacles. I have argued further that, contrary to 
popular thinking, Kant does not think we can master our mental illnesses 
through sheer force of will. On Kant’s view, the causes of mental illness are 
varied and they are not caused by the misuse of our cognitive abilities. 
Even though we cannot reason ourselves out of mental illness, Kant thinks 
there are ways we can actively participate in our own mental recovery and 
management. Contrary to popular readings of Kant as a champion of rea-
son’s power, Kant’s conception of mental illness shows that he recognizes 
how fragile human reason can be.
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